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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 John Shover pleaded guilty to one count of production of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). The District Court sentenced Shover to 24 years 
in prison and imposed a special assessment of $5,000 pursuant to the Justice for Victims 
of Trafficking Act of 2015 (“JVTA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3014. Under the JVTA, courts must 
impose a $5,000 assessment against non-indigent persons convicted of certain offenses, 
including offenses related to the exploitation of children. Shover appeals the imposition 
of the $5,000 special assessment. He contends the District Court improperly based its 
finding of non-indigency on the availability of prison wages. Furthermore, he contends he 
meets the definition of indigency no matter how it is defined.  
 The District Court properly considered the availability of prison wages in 
determining indigency. But the court did not adequately address Shover’s negative net 
worth and inability to earn future wages post-release. Accordingly, we affirm the District 
Court’s sentence except for the imposition of the $5,000 special assessment and remand 




* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Pennsylvania State Police received a report about sexual abuse involving a 14-
year-old female—the adopted daughter of John Shover. Upon executing a search warrant 
of Shover’s residence and electronic devices, police discovered six images of child 
pornography, five of which were of Shover’s daughter. Shover waived his Miranda rights 
and admitted to creating the images and to repeated sexual abuse.  
Following an indictment by a grand jury, the Magistrate Judge appointed a Federal 
Public Defender to represent Shover upon finding that he was financially unable to obtain 
counsel on his own. Shover then pleaded guilty to illegal production of child pornography 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e).  
After Shover’s guilty plea but before sentencing, the United States Probation 
Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) that provided the court with information 
about Shover’s education, employment history, and financial condition. According to the 
PSR, Shover graduated from high school in 1980 and obtained a now-expired license in 
dairy farm inspection. From 2001 through 2016, Shover earned $20.60 per hour as a 
“milk tanker driver/supervisor.” Shover then worked as a grocery stocker and material 
handler earning $9 per hour and $12.90 per hour, respectively. The PSR identified that 
Shover owed $11,239 on an automobile loan, $463 to a cable company, and $221,790 on 
a joint mortgage of his residence—now in foreclosure. Shover’s only reported assets 
were bank accounts with a total balance of $10 and a pick-up truck valued at 
approximately $700. Finally, Shover, filing jointly with his wife, reported an adjusted 
gross income of $3,744 to the IRS in the year preceding his arrest.  
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At the sentencing hearing, the Government contended Shover could pay off the 
assessment over the course of his prison term due to his ability to work in prison and earn 
wages. Shover’s counsel asked the court to find him indigent, contending the court had 
determined Shover was indigent for right-to-counsel purposes and the government had 
presented no evidence to show Shover was non-indigent. The Probation Office calculated 
a 292–360 month advisory guideline range and recommended Shover be subject to the 
JVTA special assessment, given his ability to earn wages in prison. Probation calculated 
the guideline range for a fine at $50,000—250,000, and concluded based on Shover’s 
financial condition that he was “capable of paying a minimal fine below the guideline 
range in installments.” 
The District Court sentenced Shover to a sentence at the bottom of the guideline 
range—292 months (24 and 1/3 years)—because Shover’s age (59 years) meant that he 
could be released after he was 80 years old. The court found Shover could not pay a fine 
but imposed a $100 special assessment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013, and the $5,000 
JVTA special assessment. With respect to the JVTA special assessment, the Court 
acknowledged Shover had been found to be indigent for the purpose of appointing 
counsel but implicitly found Shover was non-indigent for the purposes of the special 
assessment by noting that he could pay the assessment through his prison wages. This 





Shover contends the court used the wrong legal standard in determining he is non-
indigent and that it nonetheless clearly erred in finding him non-indigent.  
A. 
We begin by addressing the legal standard for determining indigency under 18 
U.S.C. § 3014. Section 3014 provides that “in addition to the assessment imposed under 
section 3013, [a sentencing] court shall assess an amount of $5,000 on any non-indigent 
person or entity convicted of [an enumerated offense].” In finding Shover non-indigent, 
the District Court emphasized that Shover is entitled to work while in prison. See Joint 
Appendix at 33 (“[T]he court notes that the defendant . . . is entitled to work during his 
term of imprisonment, and the court’s expectation is that he will be able to work and pay 
the special assessment.”). Shover contends potential prison wages should not be 
considered in a district court’s assessment of indigency under § 3014. We cannot agree. 
18 U.S.C. § 3014 does not provide guidance on how a district court should 
evaluate indigency, but a significant number of courts of appeals have concluded that, for 
the purposes of determining indigency under § 3014, an analysis of a defendant’s future 
 
1 Whether the District Court used the proper legal standard in assessing Shover’s non-
indigency is a legal question over which we exercise plenary review. United States v. 
Graves, 908 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2018) (in the context of a JVTA special assessment); 
United States v. Kadonsky, 242 F.3d 516, 518 (3d Cir. 2001) (in the context of inability to 
pay a fine). Whether Shover is a non-indigent person is a question of fact that we review 
under the clearly erroneous standard. See Kadonsky, 242 F.3d at 518 (explaining that 




financial situation is warranted.2 A defendant’s future financial situation and, thus, a 
district court’s assessment of indigency, encompasses both potential prison wages and 
potential post-release earnings. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 889 (6th 
Cir. 2019) (considering whether the defendant would be able to earn money while 
incarcerated to determine indigency). Prison wages, like post-release wages, are likely to 
impact a defendant’s future financial situation. That these earnings may be small is not 
alone a sufficient reason to conclude otherwise. Accordingly, we believe the District 
Court properly considered Shover’s ability to earn wages in prison.  
Further, the statute’s structure favors a consideration of future earning capacity 
because a defendant’s obligation to pay the assessment lasts for at least twenty years after 
judgment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3014(g), 3613(b). And the ordinary meaning of the term 
“indigent” includes a forward-looking assessment of a defendant’s financial situation. See 
United States v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The ordinary meaning of 
‘indigent’ therefore includes both someone who is poor today and someone who lacks the 
means to earn the necessaries of life in the future.”); United States v. Shepherd, 922 F.3d 
753, 758–59 (6th Cir. 2019) (drawing the inference that a defendant’s future financial 
condition should be considered from various legal and non-legal dictionary definitions of 
indigent).3   
 
2 See United States v. Clarke, 979 F.3d 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. McMiller, 
954 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 2020); 908 F.3d at 141–42; United States v. Shepherd, 922 
F.3d 753, 758–59 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Barthman, 983 F.3d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 
2020); United States v. Kelley, 861 F.3d 790, 801 (8th Cir. 2017).  
3 Black’s Law Dictionary defines indigency as “[t]he quality, state, or condition of a 
person who lacks the means of subsistence; extreme hardship or neediness; poverty.” 
Indigency, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
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Relatedly, the appointment of counsel for Shover is “probative but not dispositive” 
of whether he is indigent under § 3014. Shepherd, 922 F.3d at 759. There is a 
fundamental difference between a court’s assessment of whether a defendant should be 
appointed an attorney and whether a fine or special assessment should be imposed after 
verdict. United States v. Kelley, 861 F.3d 790, 800 (8th Cir. 2017). In this context, we do 
not believe courts should be restricted by their initial determination on appointing 
counsel. See Shepherd, 922 F.3d at 759 (“This is a matter of common sense: a criminal 
defendant might be unable to pay a six-figure legal bill and yet still possess the means of 
subsistence.”).  
B. 
Shover contends he has no burden to establish non-indigency. But in the context of 
the § 3014 special assessment, the burden is on the defendant to establish his or her 
indigency. Though § 3014 does not specifically allocate a burden, the statute directs that 
the special assessment be treated like a fine. See 18 U.S.C. § 3014(f) (“The amount 
assessed under subsection (a) shall . . . be collected in the manner that fines are collected 
in criminal cases . . . .”). In the fines context, the burden is placed on the defendant. See 
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) (“The court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the 
defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any 
fine.”). Accordingly, it is a defendant’s burden to show the fact of indigency in the 






Shover also contends the District Court did not properly address his negative net 
worth and ability to earn wages post release. Shover’s PSR, which the District Court 
adopted in full and to which the government lodged no objections, established Shover 
had a negative net worth at the time of sentencing. As noted, the PSR identified that 
Shover owed $11,239 on an automobile loan, $463 to a cable company, and $221,790 on 
a joint mortgage of his residence—now in foreclosure. Shover’s only reported assets 
were bank accounts with a total balance of $10 and a pick-up truck valued at 
approximately $700. Shover, filing jointly with his wife, reported an adjusted gross 
income of $3,744 in the year preceding his arrest.  
 Despite this description of Shover’s present financial condition, the District 
Court—by imposing the special assessment—found Shover non-indigent, because Shover 
would be able to work in prison. As noted, a court may consider the availability of prison 
wages. In Wandahsega, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in upholding on plain 
error review a finding of non-indigency for a defendant with a negative net worth, noted 
that the defendant did not address the ability to earn money while incarcerated. 924 F.3d 
at 889. But defendants with negative net worth, such as Wandahsega, have generally been 
held to be non-indigent where post-release employment appeared likely.4 In contrast, the 
 
4 See, e.g., id. (noting the defendant “believes he will obtain employment . . . upon his 
release”); Shepherd, 922 F.3d at 760 (explaining that time will be on Shepherd’s side 
because he will be released “well before he turns 40 and with many years of future 
employability”); McMiller, 954 F.3d at 675 (“[T]he district court properly considered 
McMiller’s future earnings potential in imposing the special assessments.”); Kelley, 861 
F.3d at 802 (“Kelley, an Eagle Scout with a college degree, ‘certainly has the education 
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defendant in Barthman—found to be indigent—had dismal post-release employment 
prospects because he would be nearly 80 years old, if not older, upon his release. 983 
F.3d at 323. In finding Barthman indigent, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
emphasized both his age and his “substantial negative net worth” of negative $166,903. 
Id. at 322–23. We have not identified a case where a prisoner with a substantial negative 
net worth was found to be non-indigent solely based on the potential availability of prison 
wages.  
We believe the District Court did not adequately address Shover’s substantial 
negative net worth and the potential, or lack thereof, for post-release employment 
prospects. On the facts, Barthman is a similar case and instructive. Not only does Shover 
have a substantial negative net worth, but Shover will be over 80 years old and a 
registered sex-offender if he is ever released.5 See Barthman, 983 F.3d at 323 (“Barthman 
will be nearly 80 years old, if not older, when he is released from custody. Additionally, 
he will be a convicted felon with several child sex offenses on his record.”). Thus, 
Shover’s post-release employment prospects may be minimal, distinguishing his case 
from Wandahsega and other cases where, regardless of prison wages, potential post-
release earning capacity likely made the defendant non-indigent. Even if Shover is able to 
work consistently throughout his prison term, his future earning capacity may be limited 
 
and skills to be employed and to earn money from which he could pay this 
assessment.’”). 
5 Shover may never leave prison. In February 2021, he was sentenced in state court to a 
minimum of 27 years and 6 months and a maximum of 60 years in prison, running 
concurrent with his 24-year federal sentence. See Criminal Docket at 9–13, 
Commonwealth v. Shover, Docket No. CP-50-CR-0000329-2018 (Pa. C.P. Perry Cty.)  
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to prison wages in the range of $.12 to $.40 per hour. On remand, the District Court 
should consider Shover’s earning capacity in conjunction with his negative net worth and 
future employment prospects. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s sentence except for the 
imposition of the $5,000 special assessment and remand for resentencing on this sole 
issue.  
